We experimentally study the role of information targeting and its effect on coordination in a multi-threshold public goods game. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first to consider this problem. In a lab setting, we consider four treatments, one in which no information is provided and three others that vary in whom we provide the information to: a random sample of subjects; those whose contributions are below the average of their group, and those whose contributions are above the average of their group. We find that random provision of information is no better than providing no information at all. More importantly, the average contributions improve with targeted treatments. Coordination waste is also lower with targeted treatments. The insights from this research may also be relevant to management in contexts such as piracy, teendrinking, among others, where positively or negatively affecting coordination between consumers is of interest.
Introduction
Our study experimentally investigates the implications of targeted information strategies in a public good context. The research problem here was originally motivated by some interesting observations of digital piracy. Producers of digital products such as music, games, and software, argue that high piracy rates (e.g., 95% of music downloaded is pirated (IFPI, 2009 )) lead to huge losses (e.g., $21.5B due to movie piracy). They also claim that such high piracy rates can lead to a lower quality of goods and services provided because they do not have incentives to improve quality (e.g., Microsoft, 2012) .
However, announcements of such high piracy rates is striking because digital producers believe that pirates have an "everybody else is doing it, so maybe it is OK?" attitude (Levin, 2011) . 1 If the attitude is indeed valid, announcing the high piracy rates can only reinforce behavior that does not aid the producers. Interestingly, there are other contexts where the "everybody else does it" attitude exists, but strategies to deal with it have been different. Recent anti-drinking campaigns on college campuses have sent out an educational message that "those who are binge drinking think 'everybody does it' but that's simply not the case" (About.com, 2006) . 2 On a related topic, Agrawal and Duhachek (2010) even argue that anti-drinking messages to teens may have to be targeted to be effective. These anecdotes lead us to consider the following research question: In settings where individuals are not able to coordinate to attain a more efficient (or socially desired) result, is it possible to target information strategies aimed at shaping individual actions, ultimately leading to a pro-social outcome?
We formally investigate this issue using a multi-threshold public good game. 3 In our game, the multiplicity of thresholds represent the different quality levels that can be attained depending on how the individuals as a whole contribute to the public good. Such a characterization is consistent with claims in the piracy context that the quality of the digital good provided depends on the level of individual contributions. Given that our main goal is to explore the effect of different information strategies, this multiplicity of thresholds can yield a variety of possible outcomes that allows for a more precise comparison of the impact of different information strategies that may not be feasible with a single threshold game. Ordinal comparisons of policies may even be reversed between the single-and multi-threshold games. 4 Prior work has theoretically studied multi-threshold games and has shown that, contrary to continuous public goods games, Pareto-optimal outcomes are supportable as Nash equilibria in multi-threshold games (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984; Bagnoli et al., 1992) . Experimental research using a multi-threshold public good game is scarce. 5 Our main goal in this paper is to investigate if information targeted to subgroups of individuals leads to a better outcome compared to randomly providing information to everyone. To the best of our knowledge (see Section 2 for more details), we are not aware of prior work that has analyzed this problem. We choose to study this problem experimentally. It is difficult to obtain naturally occurring data or even track user behaviors in such contexts, as they often are illegal. Furthermore, it is not easy to control the information flow as effectively in a real setting as in an experimental lab.
We overcome these problems through the use of a controlled setting and exogenous manipulation of information feedback in a laboratory environment. Randomization of our treatments allows us to tightly control possible confounding and selection effects that are typical with naturally occurring data (e.g., firms may only get a selective sample of consumers when providing information about piracy rates).
Our experimental design consists of the following four treatments: no feedback, random feedback, targeted above feedback (provided only to consumers contributing more than the average), and targeted below feedback (provided only to consumers contributing less than the average). We partly choose to study random information feedback because it is similar to what is used in the piracy context by digital good producers. Targeted treatments are motivated because of the "everybody else does it" attitude. Our design focuses only on the contributions to a public good given that the treatments are exogenously set. We do not focus on the provider of the good and therefore, ours is a partial equilibrium analysis without the providing firm. The analysis of the different treatments provides several interesting insights. We find that targeted information feedback results in the greatest level of contributions by subjects, whereas randomly providing information to subjects is as ineffective as providing no information at all. Between the two targeted treatments, sending information to those that are contributing on average more to the good, provides the higher level of coordination among the subjects.
Related Literature: Information Strategies for Cooperation and Coordination
Our paper specifically relates to research that investigates the role of information about past contributions on cooperation and coordination in a public goods setting. 6 Although the information 6 An extensive experimental research on public goods provision has recognized the existence of free-riding behavior, heterogeneity in subjects' willingness to cooperate, and identified design features that affect cooperation in these games (see Anderson, 1995; Ledyard, 1995; Davis and Holt, 1993, chap.3, for an overview) . A stream of experimental research on public goods has investigated mechanisms that promote cooperation and mitigate free-riding. For instance, decentralized exogenously imposed punishment and rewards Andreoni et al., 2003; Masclet et al., 2003; Reuben and Riedl, 2009; Nikiforakis, 2008; Kosfeld and Riedl, 2004 , this last one for a review), centralized about the groups' total contribution level is commonly incorporated into public goods experiments, some papers directly explore how information about the groups' past contribution to the public good affect future contributions. Sell and Wilson (1991) is one of the first to do so. They consider three information treatments in a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM): no information about other members' contributions, aggregate information about other members' contributions, and individual information about each members' contribution. They show that contributions are significantly higher in the individualized information condition than in the other two. Contributions do not differ between the no information and the aggregated information conditions. Similarly, Weimann (1994) compares contributions of subjects in playing a VCM with different levels of information.
He finds no significant difference between the mean behavior of subjects that were informed about individual contributions of all the other players in the group and those that were only informed about the average contribution to the public good in their respective group. Following these initial works and, in an attempt to reconcile the previous results, Croson (2001) considers a VCM with feedback of the total amount contributed in a group and compares with an individual feedback treatment, in which participants are informed about the amount each other group member had contributed. Despite having found no significant differences in the average contributions between treatments, the individual feedback treatment displayed a higher variance in the contributions.
A few papers have exclusively focused on information feedback provided regarding individual contributions. Croson and Marks (1998) explores the impact of anonymous and identifiable information on contributions in a threshold public good setting. They find that: while anonymous information decreases contributions and increases the variance, identified contributions (by subject number) increases the contributions and reduces the variance. When information on individual contributions is probabilistic, results are mixed (Anderson and Stafford, 2009 ). On one hand, the a priori possibility of an announcement increases public contributions slightly. On the other hand the ex post effect of an announcement appears to promote free-riding.
We are aware of three papers that study the interaction of information feedback with the communication environment and/or heterogeneity among subjects. Cason and Khan (1999) analyzes experimenter imposed punishment and rewards (Andreoni, 1993; Falkinger et al., 2000; Croson et al., 2006; Kosfeld and Riedl, 2004 , this last one for a review), endogenously imposed institutions and group formation (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Charness and Yang, 2010; Ahn et al., 2010; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010) , communication (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Cason and Khan, 1999; Bochet et al., 2006) . the interaction of the information feedback with the communication environment. They compare the impact of informing subjects either every six periods as opposed to every period in both face-toface communication and no-communication environments. While imperfect information is shown not to reduce contributions as compared to perfect information, the face-to-face communication is
shown to be a powerful mechanism to improve cooperation even with imperfect information . Fellner et al. (2011) explores the joint effect of information and heterogeneity in players' marginal returns on the public good. In the control treatment, players are informed about their own marginal returns and about individual contributions of others in the group. In a second treatment, players are additionally informed about the productivity type of others, but they can not link their individual contributions to their respective productivity type, which is then possible in a third treatment.
They find that the information structure affects players' contributions in a setting where they have different marginal returns on the public good. More specifically, high types contribute more than low types when more information is available, generating a more efficient norm on contributions.
A more equitable norm is achieved when group members are informed about the heterogeneity but cannot link it to individual contributions. Chan et al. (1999) investigate using a nonlinear public good game how information feedback on aggregate voluntary contributions interact with both heterogeneity (on endowments and preferences for the public good), and communication. They report that incomplete information had a small and weakly significant negative effect on contributions but find no significant interaction between information, communication and/or heterogeneity. 7
The impact of information on the funding and provision of public goods has been studied in the field as well. Shang and Croson (2009) identifies a positive effect of information feedback on contributions to an on-air fund-raising campaign for a public radio station. During the campaign they varied the information given to the potential donors: it was either the 50 th , 85 th , 90 th , 95 th , or 99 th percentile of contributions made thus far. They show that the 90 th and 95 th percentile information are effective in increasing contributions and particularly effective with first-time donors.
There also report long term impacts of the information provision. First, receiving such information makes new donors more likely to renew their membership the next year as compared to those who were not informed. Second, the contributions one year later are also higher in the social information 7 Experimental research (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1998; Rondeau et al., 1999; Levati et al., 2007) has also studied the role of complete vs. incomplete information in games where players are asymmetric (with respect to their endowments, preferences for the public goods, payoff functions, etc.).
treatments than in the no-information treatment.
Apart from Croson and Marks (1998) , all of the other papers mentioned above use a VCM in which the dominant equilibrium is contributing nothing for the public good. Our multi-threshold public goods game -as will be discussed later -has multiple Pareto-ranked pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and as such, our paper relates to research on the impact of information on subjects' behavior in coordination games in general. A few studies analyze the impact of information about previous choices of others in the minimum-effort games. 8 Overall, the results are mixed. Berninghaus and Erhart (2001) and Brandts and Cooper (2006) show a positive effect on coordination, while Devetag (2005) and Van Huyck et al. (2006) find that ex post information does not solve mis-coordination problems. Deck and Nikiforakis (2010) investigate the impact of real time information about the choices of others. Compared to a baseline treatment of no real-time information, imperfect monitoring (subjects only observe actions of their immediate neighbors in a circle networks) does not improve coordination, while perfect information (subjects observe all the actions of players) makes almost all groups coordinate at the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Our paper investigates the effect of information about previous contributions on cooperation and coordination just like many other prior works, but ours does so in a multi-threshold public goods context. The main distinction, however, is that we explore whether targeted information is a better mechanism for cooperation and coordination than a random provision of information. The role of targeted information has not been addressed in prior research to the best of our knowledge.
The Game, Theoretical Predictions, and Parameterization
This section deals with a standard single-period multi-threshold public good game.
The Multi-Threshold Public Good Game
We consider n symmetric individuals concerned with the provision of a single unit of a public good with a specific quality. The quality can be one of the elements of the ordered set Q and is represented by an index variable q (starting at 1). Each consumer is endowed with an initial amount E i , which can either be invested in a private account or used towards the provision of the public good. Every individual, i, simultaneously and independently chooses to contribute x i from their initial endowment to the public good.
The individual earnings from investing in the private account are simply E i −x i . The individual earnings from consumption of the public good depend on the quality of the public good. A public good of quality q is provided in a threshold setting with a cost of X q . So, only if i x i ≥ X q units, the quality provided is q. The costs are increasing in quality, i.e., X q+1 − X q > 0 and because X 1 = 0, a minimum quality is always assured for the public good. The utility function for individual i is linear and given by:
where v Our setting does not contemplate refunds or rebates. More specifically, contributions are not returned to their contributors when the provision point is not met. Also, contributions are not returned when they exceed a certain threshold but are insufficient for the next quality level.
In the following subsections, we analyze the equilibrium of this game. The equilibrium analysis discussions are kept generic but whenever needed, we use the parameters from our experimental setup as an example. In our experiment, we consider n = 5 players, each with an initial endowment of E i = 50. Table 1 shows the earnings from the public good and the various thresholds. Our choice of parameters is such that the step return (SR), which is the ratio of the aggregate group value from consuming a certain quality public good to their share of the cost, SR = nv q X q is greater than 1. Otherwise, it would not be worth producing that quality level. Note also that the step returns are higher when the quality of the public good is higher. Individuals therefore have an incentive to coordinate to a higher quality level.
9 Individuals are assumed to only care about their private account and the quality level of the public good. They are assumed not to have warm glow feelings from contributing to the public good. Therefore, the individual's utility does not depend directly on a contribution the individual makes to the public good (Andreoni, 1990 
Theoretical Predictions
In this subsection we discuss the theoretical predictions under two assumptions about social preferences: 1) individuals care only about their own earnings, and 2) individuals also care about the earnings of others. In particular, they care about how their own monetary payoff compares with the monetary payoffs of others.
First, consider narrow self-interest preferences. In equilibrium, the individual decision on how much to contribute to the public good depends on how much her contribution is crucial for the provision of a certain quality level. Denote by X −i the sum of the individuals' contributions of everyone except i. Contribution of zero is the best response of individual i whenever X q−1 ≤ X −i ≤ X q −E i , for all q and q−1 that are indexes of Q. Individual i's contribution is crucial for provisioning a public good of quality q if and only if
Being crucial is necessary but not sufficient for i's contribution. No individual contributes any positive amount to the public good if her individual gain from extra quality is not positive, i.e., the individual rationality constraint,
has to hold. It follows that the decision rule for each individual i is:
Assuming that a public good with quality q can be provided, i.e., the group has enough endowment so as to make an equilibrium level feasible and the value to the entire group of the provision of such quality is larger than the cost, i.e,
there is a continuum of pure Nash equilibria 10
10 Both pure and mixed equilibria are feasible but we focus on pure Nash equilibria only.
consisting of all feasible situations where quality thresholds are met. In particular, these equilibria consist of all vectors of x i satisfying the efficiency constraint: x i = X q and the individual rationality constraint:
. These equilibria can be symmetric or asymmetric depending on the cost-sharing rule. In a symmetric equilibrium x i = x j , ∀ i, j, while in an asymmetric equilibrium, at least ∃ i and j s.t. x i = x j . Note that the symmetric equilibria in our game are not necessarily payoff equivalent. Also, the Pareto-efficient equilibria maximizes the step return.
Corresponding to the parameters of our experimental setup, the set of pure Nash equilibria are as follows: 1) x * i = 0 and q * = poor ; 2)
n j=1 x i = X 2 , and q * = medium; 3)
n j=1 x i = X 4 , and q * = very good ; 5)
, and q * = excellent.
Next, assume that agents are motivated by inequity aversion as in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) .
In particular, individuals not only care about their own monetary payoffs but also how their payoffs compare with those of other subjects. For an n-player game with monetary payoffs y = (y 0 , ..., y n ), player i maximizes the expected value of her motivation function,
relative share of the payoffs:
The motivation function is assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable, concave in the relative argument with a maximum achieved when player i's own share is equal to the average share (social reference point). In particular, consider the additively separable motivation functional form for a n-player game (cf. the 2-player example in Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, page, 173) :
where a ≥ 0 and b > 0. In this expression the parameter a measures the extent to which a player cares about his own monetary payoff. Parameter b reflects the concern for earning more or less than the average earnings of the group. The further y i is from the average, the higher the loss from the relative term. This function nests to two extreme cases: 1) If a = 0, the player exhibits strict relativism and achieves maximum utility at the social reference point; 2) If b → 0, the player has narrow self-interest preferences.
The value of a b is thus decisive for player i's contribution to the public good in response to the total contribution of others. Whenever b = 0, the set of all possible Nash equilibria is smaller as compared to the set of equilibria when players exhibit narrow self-interest. 11 Figure 1 illustrates these predictions for our experimental parameters. The solid black lines refer to the standard Nash equilibria where the combined allocation of tokens for the group account exactly satisfies a given threshold. The solid green line exemplifies the existence of inequity aversion preferences, where the a b determines the number of asymmetric equilibria. If all players show a preference for strict relativism, i.e., a = 0, there are only symmetric equilibria (the red crosses along the 45 • line).
The green bold line can move downwards or upwards in case players do not suffer equally from advantageous and disadvantageous inequity (if players are motivated by inequity aversion as in Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . 
Information Regimes and Hypotheses
The discussion thus far has dealt with the standard single-period multi-threshold public good game. We use this game to study the implication of targeted information feedback. So, this game is repeatedly played over a number of rounds while varying the targeted population receiving information. Section 4.1 presents the information regimes we study and Section 4.2 the related hypotheses.
Information Regimes (Treatments) and Comparison Metrics
Our study involves four information regimes. The first one is called No Info, where no information feedback is provided across the rounds. The equilibrium analysis presented in the previous section is directly applicable to this regime. In each of the other three regimes, before individuals make contribution decisions, a subset of subjects in the group is informed about the average previous round contribution of their present group members. The subset that receives the information differs across the three regimes. In the Random Info regime, the subset of subjects to receive the information is randomly decided. In the Target Below (Target Above) regime, the subjects to receive the information are those whose previous round contributions are below (above) the average previous period contribution of their present group members.
We compare these regimes on both the average and variance of the contributions. We also study how the efficiency and waste measures of the regimes compare. We define efficiency as the surplus achieved relative to the maximum feasible surplus:
and waste as the excess of the contribution above the threshold needed for the quality level achieved:
Recall that our multi-threshold game has increasing step returns on the thresholds. The efficiency (η) is less than 100% whenever the combined contributions fail to produce the highest quality public good. If subjects can coordinate to a particular level without any waste (i.e., w = 0), then the efficiency level corresponding to our experimental parameters for Poor quality is zero, for
Medium quality is 10%, for Good quality is 30%, and 60% for a Very Good quality level. Excess w further decreases η.
Hypotheses
If players care only about their own monetary payoffs, an individual's contribution decision depends exclusively on her estimation of how crucial her contribution is in achieving a certain quality level.
When information about the group's contribution behavior is also provided, subjects may revise their estimate about how crucial their contribution is, and change their individual contribution level. Moreover, information feedback has been shown to aid coordination, even in a repeated game with random-matching. For example, in a repeated random-matching prisoner's dilemma game, information on the current partners' past actions can theoretically be enough to sustain any level of cooperation (Takahashi, 2010) . Therefore, in our case, if subjects receive information and use it to correctly revise their estimates about others' contributions, we expect them to coordinate more efficiently and, possibly, to a higher quality level.
Even if information feedback aids in coordination, we do not expect differences in coordination across the information treatments (i.e., Random Info, Target Below, Target Above). That is, targeting information to those either below or above the average contribution of the group should make no difference in the individuals' ability to coordinate to a more efficient equilibrium, as compared to what may happen in Random Info. We hypothesize so because we have no reason to a priori expect any difference either in the number of subjects that contributed below or above the average, or in the size of the deviations of individual contributions to the group average across treatments.
Hypothesis 1. According to standard Nash equilibrium predictions, targeted treatments should be no different than providing information randomly when comparing the average contribution.
Hypothesis 2. Treatments where information is provided achieve higher efficiency than No Info.
The previous two hypotheses are derived assuming narrow self-interest preferences. Individuals, however, may have social preferences, such as an aversion for inequity, a preference for conformity (i.e., "everybody else is doing it" attitude), or exhibit reciprocal behavior. So, targeting information may influence subjects' decisions differently across treatments. In particular, consider that individuals have a preference for strict relativism (cf. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and dislike earning more or less than the average (see, Section 3.2), we expect the targeted treatments to result in a different level of coordination compared to Random Info. If a player observes a low average contribution level in Random Info, her optimal choice -given her inequity-aversion preferences -consists of decreasing her own contribution. However, if a player observes a high average contribution level in Random Info, the player may encounter disutility from other players doing worse than oneself, resulting in an increase in her own contribution. Because these adjustments will be simultaneously made, we expect no differences in the quality provided in the Random Info treatment as compared to the quality in the No Info treatment. We do, however, expect a convergence to a more symmetric contribution level. 12
For the same reasons mentioned above, we believe the targeted feedback treatments will also reach more efficient equilibria. However, we expect differences in the average contributions. In
Target Below, the subjects contributing below the average will first move along the solid black threshold lines shown in Figure 1 to a more symmetric rate of contribution. Because subjects above the average do not receive any information feedback, their behavior is not expected to change. Consequently, in Target Below, it is possible to observe a higher quality level along time, and also more asymmetric contributions. The opposite result is expected for the Target Above treatment. An implication of Hypothesis 4 is that the average contribution is higher with Target Below than with Target Above.
Implementation
As mentioned earlier, in our experiment, we set n = 5, E i = 50, and the threshold and quality parameters as in Table 1 . We conduct four different sessions of the multi-threshold game described in Section 3.1, each having 46 rounds per session. Within each session, a participant is subjected to two distinct treatments. Table 2 shows how the rounds correspond to each treatment in each of the four sessions. Note that the regimes where information is provided are paired with the No Info regime in Sessions B, C, and D; whereas the No Info regime is paired with the Random Info regime in Session A. Our primary interest is in contrasting the feedback treatment effects on coordination, for which a between-subject analysis is preferred to minimize learning effect differences.
We also conduct the within-subject comparison to infer how the regimes, particularly ones where information is provided as feedback, differ when information ceases after a few rounds. The last block of rounds allows us to compare the impact of reintroducing information. The first round in each session has subjects receiving no information feedback (because we have no prior actions at that point). Thereafter, information regarding a players' contributions may be provided as feedback depending on the treatment. In each round, the subjects are randomly re-assigned to new groups by the computer. 13 Subjects are never informed of who is in their group or the specific decisions that other subjects make during the experiment. Designing the matching in this way minimizes direct reciprocity and enables us to most appropriately capture the equilibrium for the one-shot game (Andreoni and Croson, 2008; Croson, 1996) .
At the beginning of each round, the endowment E i = 50 is set. 14 Next, subjects are asked about their beliefs regarding the average contribution in their group. Belief elicitation was not incentivized 13 It is possible that subjects remain in the same group for one or more rounds, but this information is never communicated to them.
14 The purpose for providing the endowment each round is to avoid exposure to potential risk due to the subjects' prior performance, as well as maintain the non-repeated design in our game.
to avoid any interference of the elicitation process with contribution behavior (Gächter and Renner, 2010) . Following that, depending on the treatment, a subset of subjects -beginning with Round 2 -may receive information about the average contribution that their current group would make if every group member continued with the same contribution level as in the previous round. At this stage, all subjects are reminded of their own allocation rate from the prior round. Subsequently, subjects then choose their individual contribution to the public good, x i . For x i , subjects were allowed to only enter integers in [0, 50] . 15 Once all the individuals choose their contributions, the quality level attained and the individual profit for the round are displayed to each subject. Note, however, that subjects are never informed about their group members' contribution for the public good. This aforementioned procedure is repeated for every round.
At Round 17, when the information treatments change, subjects are explicitly notified. They did not ex ante know if or when the treatment would change. When the treatments changed again in Round 32, subjects were notified (but not whether/when they receive information).
Individual earnings from all 46 rounds are recorded by the computer and by subjects on their own information sheets. Toward the end of the experiment, we randomly choose three of the 46 rounds for payment. We did so to minimize wealth effects. Their earnings in experimental tokens was then converted to US dollars at the rate of 20 tokens per dollar.
In order to achieve the same amount of information each period, we use the same algorithm for determining how many subjects in each group will receive the information. This technique allows for direct comparison of results between the information treatments. In the targeted rounds the specific below or above average subjects receive information. We use this algorithm for determining the number of participants that will receive information in the non-targeted rounds. More specifically, we count the number of subjects that would have been targeted, and then randomly select the same number of subjects for the randomly given information.
We conducted the experiment at an experimental economics laboratory at a large midwestern university in February of 2010. Subjects were recruited by email using the laboratory's online recruitment system, and subject participation was limited to a single session. The computerized experimental environment was implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Subjects were ran-domly assigned to individual computers and communication was not allowed during the session.
Copies of the experiment instructions were provided to each subject and were read aloud by the experiment administrator. A copy of the instructions used to conduct the experiment is available in Appendix A. Completion of control questions was required to ensure each subject understood the experimental procedures prior to starting the actual experiment. Any subject that failed to answer the control questions after three attempts was personally assisted by the experiment administrator.
For every round, we followed the procedure described in the experimental design section. At Round 17, the supplemental instructions were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter.
A total of 90 subjects participated in our experiments (Session A: 20 subjects, Session B: 25 subjects, Session C: 25 subjects, Session D: 20 subjects). The experiment lasted on average 1 hour and subjects were compensated between $8.25 and $16.75, with the average subject earning $12.60.
All subjects were paid in cash privately and individually at the conclusion of the experiment after completing a short demographic questionnaire.
Experimental Results
This section presents the analyses of our experimental data. Our main interest is to compare the information strategies and, for that, we conduct the between-subject analysis of data from the first block of rounds. Sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 present these results. Subsequently, we consider the within-subject analysis, using all of the rounds in Section 6.4, which allows us to investigate the effects of introducing, eliminating, and re-introducing information in our treatments. 
Aggregate Performance

Group Behavior: Quality Provision and Efficiency
The aggregate picture presented earlier hides group behavior and also fails to account for group heterogeneity. Table 4 shows the fraction of groups that attain a certain quality level in each treatment. Both No Info and Random Info appear to be similar in terms of the quality distribution.
In contrast, the targeted treatments are skewed more towards higher quality. A KolmogorovSmirnov test on the equality of the distributions reveals that there is not a statistically significant difference in the frequency distributions between No Info and Random Info (p = 0.99). However, similar tests reveal that there is a statistically significant difference in the frequency distribution of Random Info from both Target Below (p = 0.00) and Target Above (p = 0.00). Next, we investigate efficiency levels and coordination waste. Table 13 in Appendix C shows the coordination waste for every quality level under each treatment. provided to subjects in targeted treatments serves to reduce dispersion, thereby improving the symmetry of the contributions. Thus, there is not enough support for Hypothesis 3. The non-parametric tests discussed earlier do not consider any individual effects, which we next consider in the Random effects GLS regressions. We estimate three different models with others. An interesting observation is that the impact of beliefs on contributions diminishes in the targeted treatments. The (targeted) information seems to play a role in these treatments. The next question is: how does information lead to the aforementioned outcomes?
Individual Behavior
Above, z = 8.16, p = 0.00; Random Info vs. Target Below, z = 3.94, p = 0.00; Random Info vs. Target Above, z = 7.25, p = 0.00; Target Below vs. Target Above, z = 4.46, p = 0.00. We also used Levene's test to directly compare the variances and those comparisons where consistent to the results presented here.
A simple comparison of the information treatments is insufficient to disentangle the role of information because not everyone within a treatment receives information. In other words, our experiment incorporates a treatment-in-treatment design, wherein the regimes are different in the first level and whether or not information is received in the second level. So, to study the effect of information, we consider each information regime separately. Table 8 shows the estimates. The first variable listed is a dummy that is assigned a value of one if a particular subject received information in the particular round, and zero otherwise. The second variable captures the elicited beliefs. The coefficient on the information dummy indicates that subjects receiving information do not significantly alter the contributions in Random Info. The main message from these estimates is that subjects receiving information make lower contributions in Target Below whereas it is the opposite in Target Above. 22 At first glance, it might be puzzling why provisioning information in Target Below leads to lower contributions whereas the same information has an opposite effect in Target Above. Note that the Information estimator is potentially misleading or biased given that subjects in the targeted treatments are not randomly selected to receive information. It is possible that subjects are heterogenous. So, although the nature of information is the same across the treatments, subjects who receive the information may be inherently different in their beliefs and, consequently, make differing levels of contributions. To explore this possibility, we consider No Info (where no subject receives information) and investigate the differences in beliefs as well as contributions between those contributing above and below the average. Then, we intend use those estimates to compare against those in the targeted treatments, i.e., we adopt a difference-in-difference approach, with No Info as the reference treatment.
If in No Info the average beliefs as well as the average contributions are different between those that contributed below and above the average in the previous round, then it should point to heterogeneity amongst the subjects and also to the different subject populations receiving information in the two targeted treatments. Interestingly, we find that those that contributed above the average have (statistically significant) higher beliefs on average about others' contributions (30.10) than those that contributed below the average (27.11). The contributions in these two groups are consistent with subjects' beliefs, as the group with higher beliefs also has (statistically significant) higher contributions (30.72 versus 16.86), as in Table 9 . 23 Next, we compare the effect of information on contributions across the two targeted treatments using the averages in Table 9 . Specifically, we compare the difference in the average contributions between those receiving information in Target Individuals in Random Info -both the above and below average contributing subjects -seem to behave consistent with the inequity aversion predictions. So do the subjects receiving information in Target Below but not those receiving information in Target Above. One potential explanation for the difference is that subjects in the targeted treatments may be learning how to get information, and therefore may pursue actions that lead them to receive information. Again, the heterogeneity between the below and above average groups may also lead to different behavior regarding to information-seeking strategies, and further contribute to differences between treatments.
Effects of Withdrawing and Reintroducing Information
Previous results showed that when information is targeted (either below or above the average), it generates higher contributions than providing it randomly. In the following, we investigate whether the provision of information has a lasting effect even if no information is provided in subsequent rounds. We also study whether re-introducing the information -after providing no information in the middle block of 15 rounds -maintains the consistency of the results. Thus, this section examines all of the rounds that subjects had played during our experiments. Here, we will refer to the sessions in the same manner as in Table 2 , which is portrayed again in Table 10 . Table 10 presents the average contributions for each of the three blocks. For Session A, there is no significant difference between the first and second blocks of rounds. Although the mean is slightly smaller in the second block compared to the first block, subjects generally appear to be maintaining the same level of contributions after moving to the random information treatment. The withinsubject comparison of No Info and the Random Info treatments replicates the between subjects comparison of the same two treatments that we presented earlier (see Table 6 .1). Nevertheless, in the third block when information ceases again, the average contribution is significantly lower than the other two. 26 In Session B, contributions degrade quite rapidly across the blocks. We observe statistically significant differences when comparing contribution averages in any two blocks. 27 In Session C, there is no statistically significant difference between the contribution averages of the first two blocks. When information is re-introduced, the average contribution is lower than that in the first block. 28 Finally, in Session D, the average contribution remains about the same (at a high level) across the blocks.
From Table 10 , it seems that even though the contribution averages are not significantly different between Random Info versus No Info in the first block, provisioning information randomly at a later point in time (Round 17) may slow down the decreasing trend in contributions. 29 Table   11 shows the random effects GLS model assuming Random Info as the baseline. We find that the average contributions decline over time for the baseline (i.e., the coefficient for Round is statistically significant at p < 0.01). The trend is same for Target Below even though the trend is less steep.
The contributions are not significantly declining with Round in Target Above. Thus, this result is consistent with the earlier one that the targeted treatments perform better than Random Info. 26 The third versus the first block, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank, z = 2.48, p < 0.05; and versus the second block, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank, z = 2.09, p < 0.05. 27 The first versus the second: two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank, z = 6.41, p < 0.001; the second versus the third: two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank, z = 7.09, p < 0.001; and the first versus the third: two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank, z = 12.66, p < 0.001.
28 two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank, z = 2.63, p < 0.01. 29 The decreasing trend can be observed from a random effects GLS regression (p < 0.01).
Conclusion
Targeting with the aim of nudging a participant to engage in a particular activity such as purchasing a product or service is universally well-known (popularly, we refer to it as marketing). However, very little is known on how to target when the aim is to dissuade a participant from engaging an action such as free-riding. We were motivated to study this issue because of several real world examples such as piracy, teen-drinking, among others. In light of these contexts, our overall research goal is to understand the role of information targeting as a coordination mechanism.
We chose to study the problem experimentally in a lab because secondary data of illegal activities (which are typically the ones we discourage the participants to engage in) subject to various treatments is typically quite hard to obtain. We construct a multi-threshold public good game and study the various information treatments. These treatments vary in terms of what kinds of participants receive information about the average of others' contributions: (1) In No Info, none of the participants receive information; (2) In Random Info, some participants are randomly selected for information; (3) In Target Below, participants whose contributions are below the average of the group, receive it; and (4) In Target Above, it is the opposite.
Our analysis finds that Random Info is no better than No Info from an average contribution standpoint, and our results are consistent with prior work (e.g., Sell and Wilson, 1991; Croson, 2001) . Assuming there are costs to disseminating information, firms adopting the Random Info strategy may actually be worse-off. This is particularly intriguing because the announcements of piracy rates in digital good contexts are similar to a Random Info regime. A more surprising result is that targeting strategies appear to generate higher contributions. We originally thought that contribution behaviors would be consistent with inequity aversion, reciprocity, or conformity (i.e., "everybody else is doing it" attitude) models; but we did not find supporting evidence. It is likely that by targeting information to either high or low contributors, we are implicitly taking advantage of heterogeneity in the consumer / participant population. This line of thinking may be further explored given the recent behavioral economic results about the enforcement of contribution norms with heterogeneous populations (Reuben and Riedl, 2011) .
Often, experimental works have received concerns regarding whether the subject pool -which is typically students -is representative of the population in the real world context. Interestingly, in our study, many of the problems we deal with (such as piracy, teen-drinking) are issues that are pertinent to the same subject pool. Even then, the question about framing the problem in an abstract fashion leading to a different set of results remain. It is possible to explore this further with a field experiment in collaboration with digital good manufacturers. Analyses from such field experiments will add further validation for our results.
A Experiment Instructions
This is an economic experiment about decision making under uncertainty. Listening carefully to these instructions will help you to earn a significant amount of money, which you will receive in cash privately at the end of the experiment. Your earnings in this experiment will depend on your performance in the individual rounds. Your final payout will be determined by three random draws done by the computer at the conclusion of the experiment. The three draws will correspond to three rounds during the experimental session. The total earnings over these three randomly selected rounds will be taken to calculate your final payout. All earnings in this experiment will be presented to you in tokens and converted to US dollars at the conclusion of the experiment. The conversion rate is: 20 tokens per 1 US dollar. The conversion rate is identical for everyone.
You are welcome to ask questions at any time by raising your hand. Please wait for an experimenter to come to your seat before asking your question. While the experiment is in progress, please do not speak or in any other way communicate with other participants. This is important to the validity of the study.
Specific Guidelines:
You will participate in 46 rounds in a group with four other participants. Participants are rematched randomly at the beginning of each round to a new group of five participants.
You will not know who is in your group. In each round you will receive an endowment of 50 tokens. The endowment is identical for everyone. You and every member in your group have to individually decide how much of this endowment to allocate to a group account. This allocation must be a whole number, between 0 and 50 tokens. All decisions are made simultaneously and without communication. No other group member will ever know how much you choose to allocate to the group account.
Your earnings in each round are determined by combining what is left of your endowment after the allocation, plus the consumption of a product. The earnings equation is presented below.
Your earnings = endowment -your allocation + product quality value
The value from the product depends on the total group allocation. If the group allocation is between 0 and 49, the quality of the product is Poor and the product quality value for you is 0 tokens. If the group allocation is between 50 and 99, the quality of the product is Medium and your product quality value is 18.5. If the group allocation is between 100 and 149, the quality of the product is Good and your product quality value is 45.5. If the group allocation is between 150 and 199, the quality of the product is Very Good and your product quality value is 81. Lastly, if the group allocation is greater than 200, the quality of the product is Excellent and your product quality value is 125. These are summarized in the table below.
Examples:
1. If your combined group account for a round is 70 tokens, the quality of the product delivered to your group in that round is Medium. This will result in 18.5 tokens added as your Product Quality Value.
2. If your total payout for the three randomly chosen rounds is 232 tokens, you will earn $11.60.
In this case the experimenter will pay you a total of $11.75 in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. Are there any questions?
B Supplemental Instructions
Subjects receive the following supplemental instructions if their session begins with an information condition. These instructions will also be used after a restart if the subject's session began with a no feedback information treatment.
IMPORTANT:
Some participants in each group might receive information at the beginning of each round. If you receive information, you will see the average number of tokens the participants in your current group allocated to their prior group accounts in the previous round. The average number of tokens is presented as if you were in the same group last round.
Examples:
1. If every participant in your current group chose to allocate 10 tokens to the group account last round, the average allocation presented to you in the current round is 10 tokens. Mann-Whitney rank-sum U tests. Bold-faced z-scores > 1.96 are statistically significant. 
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